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ance and imbalance between major parts of the energy sector. Some
examples were:
Emphasis on nuclear technologies versus increased need in nonnuclear sectors;
Emphasis on electric power provision, to the neglect of other activities;
Emphasis on provision with respect to more efficient utilization (i.e.,
conservation);
Emphasis in the physical and technological aspects, often to the
neglect of societal consequences;
Emphasis on long vis-A-vis short-term prospects, where the attention was gratifyingly satisfactory toward long-term technologies; and
Lack of attention to manpower provision or public communication.
Extensive congressional hearings took place during the Spring of
1975, for which the OTA assessment provided a strong background of
relevant material.
A similar but enlarged assessment now proceeds at OTA, with respect to the Energy Research and Development Administration's National Plan, revealed to us on June 30. ERDA itself has incorporated in
its new plan a number of ideas generated by the earlier OTA activity and
the congressional debate. Many of the same issues as before will be
covered again, this time with more sophistication, as OTA, the Congress,
and the Executive Branch learn the value of such constructive debate.
This brief summary is meant as an example only. The OTA presently
has strong programs in materials, ocean-related topics, and many other
areas, and these brief remarks are meant to give an indication of the
usefulness of technology assessment organized in the right way and in the
right places.
As the parts of society become more and more integrated, as common resources dwindle, and as an ever-increasing world population demands an ever-increasing quality of life, better organization of energy,
resources, housing, transportation, health care-any major thing you
care to name-must be provided. Each area of activity impinges upon
many others, as we have seen in current examples; politics affects energy
availability, and vice versa; energy and the environment often seem to
clash. Technology assessment, an attempt to organize the holistic nature
of these coupled activities, becomes increasingly important with time,
and hopefully our sophistication grows with time to perform the work.
SOME REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

Dr. Michael S. Baram
To conclude this wide-ranging panel discussion, I want to briefly address
two aspects of regulation which have been troublesome, and for which
Technology Assessment may be particularly useful.
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The first aspect, which relates to radiation and other hazardous
substances in general, is the increasingly important regulatory function
of forcing the development and application of appropriate control technologies on industry-normally, the development and application of
devices and techniques to protect public and worker health and safety.
The question becomes: Is the regulatory program appropriately forcing
and guiding necessary advances in control techniques and their timely
use?
We are familiar with the controversy which now surrounds a number
of provisions of the Air and Water Pollution Control programs, the
Atomic Energy and Offshore Development programs, OSHA, etc.controversy about the nature and magnitude of adverse effects and the
availability, reliability and feasibility of control measures to use.
Should the control requirements to be imposed by agencies on industry, normally in the form of design and performance requirements, be
based on the economic feasibility of the techniques, on the basis of health
effects and environmental effects, or by some balancing of both considerations? Congress has provided conflicting messages to the agencies in its
legislation, and the agencies are left-with the difficult value judgments as
to what approach is authorized by Congress to be in the societal interest
-to allow a firm or industry to continue to discharge hazardous materials
until economically feasible controls are developed; to shut down a polluter because of emissions determined by the agency to be possibly dangerous to human health, irrespective of the economic considerations; to use
cost-benefit analysis in determining the requirements to be imposed; or
what?
Technology Assessment of such problems and their alternative solutions could provide Congress with a better understanding of the nature
of the problem, and objective information on industrial ability to respond
with new control measures, within certain time frames. Congress could
thereupon provide the agencies with more realistic control requirements
and schedules and less discretion on the tradeoffs to be made in regulation. Maybe it is unrealistic to assume that technology assessment could
bring about the shifting of some of this judgmental burden onto the
Congress where it belongs, but it deserves some consideration.
Another way of looking at this or, more accurately, a second facet
of regulation for which technology assessment may be useful, concerns
what analytical methods should be employed in agency rule-making or
standard-setting. Should an agency striving to set various standards for
ionizing radiation, for example, standards for radiation discharge, environmental levels, and human exposure, use cost-benefit analysis? The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission presently uses this balancing technique
-in other words, radiation standards are being set at the balance point
between the control costs and the health and other benefits. True costbenefit requires numbers. It is very difficult to establish numerical values
for health benefits such as a reduction of deaths and illnesses. It is also
very difficult to get reliable information from industry on what the true
costs of imposing new controls to further reduce radiation would be.
Should cost-benefit be used in matters involving health and safety at all?
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In the highway safety and motor vehicle safety fields, Congress and the
agencies have rejected use of cost-benefit in matters involving human
life-particularly for sensitive areas such as schoolbus design. Or is costbenefit'the only realistic or rational or democratic way to proceed? Could
cost-effectiveness analysis or some systems model provide a more appropriate basis for making decisions on standards with human health implications?
Here is a major task for technology assessment and our lawyers and
technical analysts, to assess the analytical techniques that are available
for regulation and standard-setting-which can range from Jeremy Bentham's felicific calculus to cost-benefit analysis, systems analysis, and
other modern techniques-in order to determine their analytical, ethical,
and other limitations and to prescribe their use in regulatory processes
accordingly and in full knowledge of these limitations.
We are learning that our problems lie not with stereotypes of agencies and industries, nor with "bad" technologies, but with our analytical
and management capabilities for running regulatory programs, capabilities which somehow must be further developed to integrate rationality
and humanism in decision-making.
QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
JUDGE LEVANTHAL (in response to a question on scientific experts
in court): ...Experts are expected to testify in court differently from
what they might say in a conversation where they are just "mind-blowing" or running up the flag of possibilities for reflection. They're not
supposed to testify in court unless their method of approach has wide
acceptance, but there are differences between experts, and in applying
even an accepted method to a particular case, there are borderline issues
and questions of judgment. Therefore, there are differences in the results
that they reach. But in each case they should have a generally accepted
methodology for analyzing the situation. Otherwise, it shouldn't be the
subject of testimony. That rule has been evolved for cases where you
have a jury. The jury is likely to be very impressed by the scientistunless the scientist contradicts the jury's own common sense of a situation, in which case they will not be impressed by the expert.
However, in an adversary situation, the lawyers and the scientists
are tangling with each other, and we do not have a constructive or
corroborative instrumentality for arriving at a disposition. Juries get to
be confused, and the courts try to present some picture to the jury
without confusing them utterly. The best that the courts have been able
to work out is to require of experts accepted methodology or accepted
scientific doctrines with some latitude for differences of opinion. If a
scientist is willing to say that he has a reasonable scientific certainty
about a matter, and if he's willing to testify to that effect, he is permitted
to testify-and give his reasons.... This is an imperfect situation and
tends to slant keeping scientific testimony out unless it has a certain
amount of establishment....
For example, about 50 years ago the court said in a rule that is
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